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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-3501 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JEFFREY SCHMUTZLER, 
                                         Appellant  
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-13-cr-00065-001) 
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 22, 2015 
_____________ 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion Filed: February 23, 2015) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Jeffrey Schmutzler appeals the District Court’s sentence, imposed after 
he pled guilty to receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).  
Schmutzler contends that: (1) the District Court erred in denying his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea; and (2) the resulting sentence was unreasonable.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.   
I. BACKGROUND 
This case stems from a federal investigation into an international movie 
production company that distributed child pornography.  Law enforcement officers 
executed a search warrant on the company’s premises.  A review of the business records 
obtained during the search indicated that Schmutzler had placed thirty-three separate 
purchase orders through the company’s website for child pornography.   
As a result of the investigation, Schmutzler entered a guilty plea to receipt of child 
pornography.  Prior to sentencing, Schmutzler retained private counsel and filed a motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that his prior counsel had failed to inform him of his 
right to challenge the indictment on the grounds of selective prosecution (because he was 
a school teacher).  The District Court denied the motion, finding that his claim lacked 
factual support and legal merit.   
At sentencing, the United States presented uncontested evidence that Schmutzler 
possessed 1,424 child pornography images in which he had photoshopped the faces of 
136 current students.  The United States also presented evidence that Schmutzler 
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possessed between two and four terabytes of child pornography, amounting to between 
four and eight million images.  Additionally, the court heard victim testimony and 
reviewed fantasy letters that Schmutzler had written depicting sexual encounters with 
students.  The District Court granted Schmutzler a three-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility and sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment and ten years of 
supervised release.   
II. ANALYSIS1 
Schmutzler first argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  “We review a district court’s ruling denying a defendant’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing pursuant to an abuse of discretion 
standard.”  United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing United States 
v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1210 (3d Cir. 1995)).  Under these circumstances, there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d) provides, in pertinent part:  “A 
defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty . . . after the court accepts the plea, but before it 
imposes sentence if . . . the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the 
withdrawal.”  The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating he has a “fair and just” 
reason, “and that burden is substantial.”  Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 (citations omitted).  We 
have asked district courts to consider three factors when considering a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea: “(1) whether the defendant asserts his innocence; (2) the strength 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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of the defendant’s reasons for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government 
would be prejudiced by the withdrawal.”  Id. (citations omitted).  We focus, as did the 
District Court, on the second factor, because Schmutzler does not assert his innocence 
nor does he address the issue of prejudice to the United States.2   
In essence, Schmutzler claims that he was unfairly prosecuted because he is a 
school teacher, and that individuals convicted of sexual offenses in state court receive 
lesser sentences than he faced.3  Even assuming arguendo that Schmutzler has the right to 
challenge his plea on selective prosecution grounds, his argument is unpersuasive.  To 
prevail on such a claim, a “defendant must ‘provide evidence that [1] persons similarly 
situated have not been prosecuted’ and that [2] ‘the decision to prosecute was made on 
the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or some other arbitrary 
factor.’”  United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 197 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United 
States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989)).  The defendant bears the burden of 
proving each of these elements with “clear evidence” sufficient to overcome the 
                                              
2 The District Court concluded that “[b]ecause Defendant has neither asserted his 
innocence nor provided a strong reason to withdraw his claim,” it need not consider the 
factor of prejudice.  App. 14.  The District Court also noted that prejudice was readily 
apparent.  Indeed, as the United States argues on appeal, withdrawal of Schmutzler’s plea 
would have resulted in, among other things, wasted governmental resources, faded 
witness memories, and the loss of potentially inculpatory evidence.  Accordingly, this 
factor also weighs in favor of the United States.   
3 We will not consider Schmutzler’s argument, raised for the first time in his reply 
brief, that he should have been entitled to discovery or a hearing to develop his selective 
prosecution claim.  See United States v. Cruz, 757 F.3d 372, 387–88 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“[B]ecause Cruz raises this argument for the first time in the Reply Brief, we will not 
consider it.  Instead, we will deem it, like the other arguments that were raised for the 
first time in the Reply Brief, to be waived.”). 
5 
 
presumption of regularity that attaches to decisions to prosecute.  Id. (citations and 
quotation omitted).   
Given these high standards, it is clear the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that his selective prosecution claim lacked merit.  Schmutzler has provided no 
evidence to suggest, yet alone establish, that similarly situated individuals have not been 
prosecuted.  Schmutzler has not identified other customers of the illicit website who were 
implicated during the course of the federal child pornography investigation, nor has he 
shown that they were spared prosecution where he was not.  Instead, Schmutzler submits 
a spreadsheet purporting to demonstrate that numerous individuals have received lighter 
sentences under state law for various child pornography and other sexual offenses.  
However, Schmutzler has failed to provide an explanation of how these individuals are 
similarly situated to him—there is no indication of whether they acted in a manner 
punishable by federal law, were implicated in similar federal investigations, or ever faced 
federal prosecution.   
Furthermore, Schmutzler has put forth no evidence to show that the government 
based its decision to prosecute him on the basis of an unjustifiable standard or some other 
arbitrary factor.  Nothing in this record suggests that the prosecutorial decision was 
influenced by Schmutzler’s occupation.  Accordingly, the District Court properly denied 
Schmutzler’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.   
Schmutzler also argues that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally and 
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substantively unreasonable.4  Under our three-step sentencing framework, district courts 
must: (1) “calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have 
before [United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)],” (2) “‘formally rul[e] on the 
motions of both parties and stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure,’” 
and (3) “‘exercise[ ] [their] discretion by considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] 
factors’ . . . in setting the sentence they impose regardless [of] whether it varies from the 
sentence calculated under the Guidelines.”  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 
(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187, 196, 194 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(first three alterations in original)).  Under the third step, the district court “must 
‘acknowledge and respond to any properly presented sentencing argument which has 
colorable legal merit and a factual basis.’”  U.S. v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
Schmutzler does not challenge the District Court’s application of the first and 
second steps; therefore, we need not address them here.  As to step three, the sentencing 
colloquy evidences that the District Court was thorough in its consideration of the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  The District Court discussed at length the nature and circumstances of 
what it characterized as a “disturbing” and “sad” case.  App. 130.  However, it noted that 
it “must evaluate the penalty by considering all aspects of this case, including the fact that 
the Defendant has no criminal record, apparently was an excellent teacher, and never 
                                              
4 We review sentences “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).  “[W]e are to ensure that a substantively 
reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.”  United States v. 
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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attempted directly to involve students in his pornography.”  Id.  The Gunter test is met.  
There is no procedural error.5 
We next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  Our review of 
the application of the § 3553(a) factors focuses on the totality of the circumstances and is 
highly deferential.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).  Indeed, 
even if this Court would have imposed a different sentence, we must not do so as long as 
any reasonable court could have imposed the given sentence.  Id. at 568.  The District 
Court’s sentence of 108 months for receiving child pornography satisfied all of the 
elements of a substantively reasonable sentence.  The District Court fully justified its 
sentence and gave appropriate consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.  Schmutzler’s 
Guidelines range was 210 to 262 months.  The District Court granted Schmutzler a 
significant downward variance and his sentence was 102 months below the bottom of the 
Guidelines range.  Schmutzler has not met his burden of showing that a reasonable 
                                              
5 We find no merit in Schmutzler’s argument that the District Court inadequately 
considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  
In support of this argument, Schmutzler submits a chart with eighteen federal cases in 
which defendants received “substantial downward departures, far below the 108 month 
sentence imposed in this case.”  Appellant Br. at 22–24.  While Schmutzler’s chart 
illustrates that some defendants in other federal possession of child pornography cases 
received shorter sentences, the chart does not demonstrate any sentencing disparities.  
Notably, Schmutzler faced a higher Guidelines range and received a downward variance 
that was greater than many of the defendants in the chart.  Schmutzler has put forth no 
evidence that there was a disparity between his sentence and other similarly situated 
defendants, let alone that the District Court did not adequately consider this § 3553(a) 
factor.  
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sentencing court would not have imposed the same sentence.6 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction of the 
District Court. 
                                              
6 Schmutzler also argues that the District Court abused its discretion by according 
undue weight to the child pornography Guidelines, resulting in an unreasonably severe 
sentence.  He claims that the District Court failed to consider sufficiently that the child 
pornography Guidelines merit lesser deference, as they are not the result of “empirical 
data and national experience,” as we explained in United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 
608 (3d Cir. 2010).  However, as we emphasized in Grober, “if a district court does not 
in fact have a policy disagreement with § 2G2.2, it is not obligated to vary on this basis.”  
Id. at 609 (citation omitted).  Furthermore, as noted supra, the District Court imposed a 
significant downward variance from the Guidelines.  Accordingly, we remain 
unconvinced by Schmutzler’s argument and conclude the below-Guidelines sentence he 
received was not substantively unreasonable.   
